Russian Tank Javelin - Is the value of the tank in modern warfare zero? That's the lesson many observers are taking from a flood of images showing Russian tanks stuck in the mud, their turrets blown off, after being ambushed and destroyed by Ukrainian forces armed with cheap anti-tank weapons. These images are often juxtaposed with feeds of Turkish-made drones destroying tanks, seemingly with ease. After the recent war in Nagorno-Karabakh, where Russian-made tanks were destroyed by the same model of drone, this is heady stuff for those willing to declare the tank dead.
We are already seeing comparisons by armor advocates to pre-World War II battle admirals who refused to see the importance of airlift, or Major General John Herr, the last cavalry commander of the 'US army, which continued to insist on the relevance of the horse on the battlefield even after the Nazi blitzkrieg against Poland and France.
Russian Tank Javelin
The US Navy was able to accommodate both the battleship and the aircraft carrier during World War II, although the battleship was primarily relied upon to provide fire support, rather than crossing the T into an enemy battle line. The horse, however, was a different problem for the army. Herr was an obstacle to modernizing the army with tanks, insisting that he would not accept any increase in armor at the expense of cavalry strength. There could be no accommodation. Consequently, the Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, used his executive authority, granted after Pearl Harbor, to get rid of all the Army's horses—and Mr. .
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What is the meaning of these anecdotes? there are two As for the battleship, the platform can be changed, but not the function. The last US Navy battleships were in active service until 1990, when the cost of maintaining them clearly outstripped their usefulness. However, the naval gunfire mission continued, albeit from smaller ships. In the case of mounted cavalry, the role is complete. And the weapon must be retired, perhaps to a good spot where it can remember its past glory. The question we have now is whether the tank is the modern equivalent of the battleship or the horse. Or maybe not either.
Tanks first appeared in World War I as a means of providing a survival maneuver option on the deadly battlefields of the Great War. Even at this early date, there were differing opinions about its usefulness. Some, notably British tank advocate J.F.C. Fuller, saw it as revolutionary. They imagined it would easily break through the enemy's defenses and push into their rear areas, wreaking havoc. Most others thought of the idea as a solution to the problem of how to advance infantry on a fire-ravaged battlefield. This is how France and the United States used tanks, taking entrenched machine guns to allow forward movement by capturing infantry. In short, the tank was a support weapon for the infantry. Germany, on the defensive for most of the war, paid little attention to the configuration of its armor.
After the First World War, the German General Staff, led by General Hans von Seeckt, studied what had happened to them during the Great War. What caused the failures of the initial offensive of 1914 - the much heralded von Schlieffen Plan - and the spring offensive of 1918 was the absence of operational mobility. Although the German army was initially very successful in 1914 and 1918 tactically and operationally, they failed strategically. Why is that so? What German General Staff officers eventually realized was that man and animal power could not negotiate the distances necessary for strategic victory before France, Britain, and the United States, blessed with interior lines , could strengthen their defenses and thwart the strategic objectives of the German general. staff German plans. An army simply cannot go to Paris fast enough to keep the enemy off balance.
The solution to this long distance mobility problem was the internal combustion engine. Tanks would provide lethal and protected mobility that would give the German army longer range. To solve the problem of fire support to support the blitzkrieg, Germany sought the aircraft. To link the two weapons, he used a new radio technology. Although history has often attributed this innovation to General Heinz Guderian, in reality the Blitzkrieg was an institutional response to solving the strategic problems encountered during the First World War.
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Only Germany adopted this approach of combining tank and aircraft into a combined arms force between the two world wars, although all combatants on the Western Front had direct experience of these technologies. This gave Germany an elegant potential solution to the vexing problem Germany had faced since unification: how to avoid a two-front war in the West and the East? Quickly defeating the rival in the west before turning east had always been the goal. The Blitzkrieg, made possible by mechanization and motorization, provided the means to achieve the strategy. Others (the US and French armies) continued to see the tank largely as an infantry support weapon or alienated their armies with takeover demands (the British Army).
World War II and the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 were the glory days of the tank. Tanks became the centerpiece of any "real" army. Development efforts focused on the reality that the best defense against a tank was another tank. There had been some improvements in anti-tank weapons for the German infantry
And the American bazooka were the most famous. However, these were short-range weapons used in ambushes or in desperation when soldiers encountered tanks.
In the 1950s, recoilless rifles began to appear in armies. These were anti-tank weapons capable of using large caliber ammunition (eg 106 millimetres), rather than using barrel recoil. Before the advent of the recoilless rifle, anti-tank weapons were much like howitzers, requiring a recoil system that absorbed energy, making the systems much larger than a recoilless rifle. These new weapons gave soldiers a long-range tank-killing capability that was, in many cases, man-portable. But even if supply had grown, it might still be too close for comfort.
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The 1967 Arab–Israeli War was the first conflict since World War II to see the large-scale use of tank formations on a mobile battlefield. The resounding Israeli victory in this conflict cemented the belief of most state militaries that the tank was the dominant force on the battlefield.
The Arab-Israeli war of 1967 was of particular importance because it validated the concepts of war of other state armies. Not since World War II in Europe had there been a major state-to-state war between similarly equipped opponents. This was especially important during the Cold War, when Allied and Warsaw Pact forces stood face to face along the German border. What the Israelis demonstrated was that the principles of combined arms maneuver—which the United States and others had adopted during World War II to defeat Nazi Germany—were sound. Furthermore, although outnumbered, the Israel Defense Forces demonstrated that well-led, trained and equipped military forces could defeat numerically superior forces. Also, since the weapons and tactics used by the Israel Defense Forces and the Arab armies largely mirrored those used by the United States and the Soviet Union, each looked to the wars to improve their own weapons and tactics, and to understand them better from another perspective. Thus, the wars in the Middle East became a proxy for what might happen in NATO.
In less than ten years, the very battlefields of the Middle East that had validated the main battle tank as the dominant force in modern combat betrayed the tank's first significant vulnerabilities. Between the Yom Kippur War of 1967 and 1973, two technologies appeared that seemingly changed everything. The development of the Sagger and other anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) gave the infantry the ability to destroy a tank at long range for the first time. Similarly, the other key component of the Israeli defense establishment, air power, was exposed by mobile surface-to-air missiles. For the first time, the superiority of the anti-aircraft team was in doubt. The two key components that supported blitzkrieg and combined arms maneuver (tanks and aircraft) had failed spectacularly.
After the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the first tank obituaries were published. Sagger showed vulnerabilities in the tank that many thought at the time were going down with failed weapons and ideas, such as the panzer's death blow at Agincourt. These expensive, high-tech systems were portrayed as a replacement for cheap and easy-to-use ATGMs. For the price of one tank, armies could deploy hundreds of ATGMs.
Anti Tank Guided Missile
Two critical questions must be answered with the arrival of ATGMs on the battlefield. First, why did armies need tanks? Second, if tanks were needed, what could be done to mitigate the ATGM threat? The answers to these two questions mattered greatly to all militaries, but especially to the Israel Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces. Again there were two contested domains, aerial and
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